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Introduction:  Trade, Pollution and Environmental Quality
In the 1980s and 90s air pollution, acid rain, and global warming became major items on
the international agenda, as environmental issues moved beyond domestic policy.   This shift
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reflects growing recognition of the global impact of economic development and the rising
problem of international externalities, as hazards spill over national borders and affect the
oceans, air, and climate.  But just as environmental risks flow through the world's biosphere, so
they also flow through the world economy -- and threaten to disrupt it.  Environmental risks tend
to concentrate in those countries with the least regulation.  Some regulatory differences exist
among countries at the same stage of development, but in the world as a whole the flow of
environmental and health risks runs from the North to the developing nations of the South.  The
mechanism of this flow is trade.
At the same time, growing consumer concerns about environmental quality and pollution
in the North are prompting more attention to environmental hazards from imported products,
particularly food.  As a result, domestic interests and other producers seeking protection from
foreign competition are finding a new source of support in the environmental and consumer
movements.  Import restrictions, when presented as a public health measure, gain a legitimacy
that they might not otherwise enjoy.
These events suggest the new realities created by uneven environmental and health
regulation and their links to trade.  When nations exchange goods and services, they also trade
environmental and health risks.  These risks are the opposite of services -- they are
environmental and health disservices traded across national borders.  This trade in disservices is
an emerging source of tension in trade negotiations.  The United States and other signatories to2
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are committed to pursuing more open
borders in the ongoing Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.  But as national health, safety, and
environmental regulations grow in importance, different national regulatory priorities pose
several related problems for trade and development.  These differences have been especially
obvious in negotiations over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
In both NAFTA and GATT negotiations, charges have been made that groups in some
countries seek to gain competitive advantage over foreign producers by moving production to
sites where environmental regulations are less strict.  Alternatively, environmental claims have
disguised protectionism, as the environment is used as an excuse to keep out imported products. 
Producers may also try to export products that threaten the health of consumers in foreign
countries.  All such actions could do unnecessary harm to both environmental quality and world
trade, unless new international arrangements are devised to resolve the problems.
The Chapter in Review
Five main issues dominate the debate over trade, pollution and the environment, and will
serve as the focus of this chapter.  The first is how best to capture the interactions of
environmental and trade measures from an analytical and modelling standpoint.  The second is
the potential environmental impact of trade liberalization, both in the regional context of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and in the global trade talks continuing in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  The third is the possible use of
environmental measures as nontariff barriers to trade.  The fourth is the relationship between
trade agreements under NAFTA and GATT and the variety of international environmental
agreements (IEA's), such as the Montreal Protocol agreement to protect atmospheric ozone. 3
Finally, a variety of institutional issues present themselves as challenges to policymakers.
For professional economists, the first challenge is an analytical one:  how to blend the
theory of externalities with international trade theory in a way which allows comparisons of both
environmental and trade impacts.  Currently, approaches to the problem are evolving from
partial equilibrium models toward more general equilibrium approaches.  Here we will adopt the
simpler, but revealing, partial framework.
The second and most politically charged issue is the concern that trade liberalization,
whether in NAFTA or under GATT, will lead to increased levels of environmental damages. 
There are numerous facets of this concern, which has been expressed strongly by a variety of
environmental groups and members of Congress.  One is the role of trade in allocating economic
activities among countries, some of which are polluting; some of which are not.  Overall, trade
promotes specialization and efficiency, but may also create incentives to export pollution itself. 
Many environmental concerns also derive from the fact that as trade expands, "scale effects"
may cause added pollution.  Scale effects are the result of increases in the quantity of goods and
services moving within countries and across borders, due to the fact that increases in trade lead
to greater transportation needs, higher levels of manufacturing output, and general increases in
the demand for raw and processed products which can impose greater wear and tear on natural
ecosystems.  Among these possible scale effects are increasing consumption of non-renewable
natural resources including fossil fuels, minerals, and old-growth forests, and increasing levels
of air and water pollution.  A particularly striking example often cited by environmental groups
is the pollution found in the rapidly growing border region between Mexico and the U.S.
(Golden, 1993).  It has also been suggested that differences in environmental standards,4
especially between North and South, will create "pollution havens" for firms and industries
seeking less regulatory oversight, as the composition of goods and services changes.  Trade also
affects the technologies employed in various countries.  Finally, trade may induce policy shifts,
either in favor of improved environmental quality, or in the opposite direction.
In contrast to the environmental community's concern over the impacts of more liberal
trade, those most directly involved in trade have tended to focus on a third main issue, the
potential for protectionism disguised as environmental action.  This can occur when a country or
trading bloc protects internal markets in the name of environmental health or safety, such as the
European Community's decision to ban the import of beef from cattle treated with certain growth
hormones.  It can also occur when higher levels of environmental standards are used to bar
market access to goods and services produced under lower levels of regulation, especially by
developing countries.  The fundamental issue concerns the ability to distinguish legitimate
environmental measures, which may well distort trade, from those which are not only trade
distorting but have little basis from an environmental standpoint.  Developing such criteria
involves complex legal, scientific and institutional issues.
The fourth issue involves the relationship between trade agreements and international
environmental agreements (IEAs).  In the last decade, a variety of new international agreements
have been negotiated in response to global environmental challenges such as ozone depletion,
species extinction, protection of Antarctica, and international management of the oceans.  The
Rio Conference on Environment and Development, held in June, 1992, resulted in a broad new
mandate for environmental action, Agenda 21, together with the creation of a new U.N.
Commission on Sustainable Development.  Some of these agreements call on their signatories to5
refrain from trade in certain goods or processes.  In the recent NAFTA negotiations, for
example, a tri-national commission was created with apparent authority over trade with
damaging environmental effects.  This commission has authority apart from the GATT, and the
existing GATT dispute resolution process.  The question is:  how are international environmental
accords to be balanced with existing or new trade obligations?  What body of international law,
and which international institutions, should exercise authority over the intersection between
multilateral environmental and trade policy?
Finally are a variety of institutional challenges for policymakers.  The increasingly
competitive trade relations between the United States, the European Community, and Japan are
one axis along which institutional issues arise.  In some respects, the high income countries of
the North are increasingly alike in placing relatively greater value on environmental quality.  But
these economies are also locked in a high stakes game of competition for global markets, and
their governments face domestic pressures to loosen regulatory oversight.  Even given their
similarities, differences exist in the North not only in scientific and environmental standards, but
in culture and social norms, which will continually confront efforts to harmonize environmental
regulations.  The gap between the environmental regulations along the North/South axis is even
wider, accentuating problems of harmonization.  The NAFTA negotiations reflect these
differences in microcosm, with Mexico attempting rapidly to upgrade its environmental
regulations in order to satisfy fears in the U.S. and Canada.  How global institutions and
domestic policies are altered to deal with these problems will determine how effectively trade
and environmental issues will be confronted in the years ahead.6
Analytical Issues
The analysis of pollution and environmental quality in an international context poses a
variety of challenges.  The traditional analytical treatment of pollution in a closed economy
(absent trade) involves externalities theory in which one agent imposes external costs on others
in ways unreflected by market prices.  This "wedge" between market prices and a shadow price
reflecting the external effect can be corrected through a Pigouvian tax-cum-subsidy scheme. 
The complexity of doing so depends in turn on the nature of the external effect.   Equivalently,
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property rights may be redefined and assigned (subject to the costs of these transactions) in such
a way that the external effect is made attributable to those who are responsible for it, thus
internalizing it (as when two firms are merged).  Generalizing from the case of an externality
imposed on a few agents, any negative effect imposed on a group of others may be modeled as a
public "bad," so that the theory of public goods and bads applies (Mishan, 1971).  In cases of a
"pure" public bad, external costs are imposed in such a way that all agents consume the same
amount of the bad (for example, a given level of pollution, such as particulates in the air).  The
dilemma is that while each agent consumes the same amount, their individual willingness to pay
to reduce the negative effect is not the same.  This stands in contrast to the pure private good (or
bad) in which each agent pays the same amount, but the quantity consumed differs depending on
individual preferences (see Samuelson, 1954).  It is the capacity to misrepresent ones'
willingness to pay in the case of public goods or bads which leads to the classic "free rider"
problem.  In the case of pollution, an individual may understate or overstate his or her true
willingness to pay for cleanup, since the price mechanism does not reveal true preferences7
(Sandler, 1992, Chapter 2).
An alternative and analytically convenient formulation is to treat an external effect from
the point of view of a producer rather than a consumer, as an input into production (see Antle
and Just, 1992).  Here, the analytical consequences depend on how pollution affects the
production technology of the firm, rather than the consumers' preferences.  While the effect of
the externality will be valued by the firm at the margin in a (negative) shadow price, this shadow
price typically will not correspond to a market price because the market fails to capture its
negative impact.
The already complicated situation arising from these market failures is made even more so
when the economy is opened to trade.  When negative external effects and bads are traded
internationally along with goods, or when they enter as negative inputs into international
production processes, what has changed analytically is that the effect is "transboundary" in
nature (Livingston, et. al., 1993).  Its transboundary nature complicates its resolution.  A
traditional tax-cum-subsidy scheme in a closed economy, for example, presumes that an
authority exists which can levy taxes or pay subsidies, or can redefine and reassign property
rights.  But when one or more nations are involved, and an international authority capable of
levying and enforcing such measures is absent, then the national governments must coordinate
their actions.  This international coordination problem aggravates the tendency of firms or
individuals to free ride by shirking responsibility for the external effect or public bad, since costs
are borne in part or in whole by foreign individuals and firms, and become the concern of
foreign governments.  A classic example is the attempt by the U.S. and Canada to develop a
coordinated approach to acid rain arising from U.S. emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO ) (Mohnen, 28
1988).  There are also important terms of trade effects arising from transboundary externalities,
so that the trading interests of nations will be affected by actions taken to regulate them (Brown,
et. al., 1993).  These terms of trade effects arise from both the costs, and benefits, of
internalizing the environmental externality.
Given these complexities, the attempt to integrate externalities theory with the neoclassical
theory of international trade is relatively recent (Krutilla, 1991; Merrifield, 1988; Antle and Just,
1992; Anderson, 1992).  Here we will develop a simple, partial equilibrium approach, following
Anderson (1992).   Consider a small country facing both market failures and the prospect of
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trade liberalization, in which its own actions do not affect the rest of the world.   The small
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country produces or consumes a commodity, such as corn, in which an externality results from
the failure of the market to account for the impact of corn production or consumption on the
natural environment.  An example of a production externality might be soil erosion which
reduces the productivity of agricultural lands and lowers water quality.  An example of a
consumption externality might be water pollution from farm chemicals which raises the risk of
water-borne disease (Sullivan, et. al., 1992).  The result of the externality is to drive a "wedge"
between private and social costs of production, reflected in the divergence of S and S1 in Figure
1.  These alternative supply curves measure marginal private and social costs, respectively.  The
demand curve, D, measures marginal private benefits.  The price axis refers to the price of corn
relative to all other prices in the economy, which remain constant throughout.
In this case, OQ is the level of corn production without either (a) international trade or (b)
measures to "internalize" environmental impacts such as erosion.  Production occurs at point e,
the intersection of private marginal benefits and costs.  Net social welfare is given as the sum of9
producer and consumer surplus, minus the social costs of the external effect, or abe ￿ ade.  Now
assume that the country shifts from autarchy (no trade), to open trade.  If OP  is the prevailing 0
international (border) price, as in Figure 1(a), production would fall to OQ , consumption would m
rise to OC  and Q C  units of corn would be imported.  Net social welfare is now abfg ￿ ahg, mm m
and the welfare gain is defgh.  This gain from trade is both positive and greater than it would
have been if no externality had existed in the form of erosion, by the shaded area degh.  In
effect, the country benefits because it imports corn more cheaply than it can producer it, and
benefits by reducing soil erosion as well.  Imports are "substitutes" for erosion.
On the other hand, suppose OP  is the prevailing international (border) price, as in Figure 1
1(b).  The country would thus become a net exporter of C Q  units of corn if it moved to open xx
trade.  Net social welfare would be abik ￿ amk, so the welfare effect of trade liberalization
without any action to internalize the effects of erosion would be
eik ￿ edmk, which could be a net gain or net loss, depending on the relative magnitude of the
gain from trade versus the loss from increased erosion as production expanded from Q to Q . x
Several propositions follow from this analysis.  The first is that liberalizing trade in a good
with adverse environmental impacts which are left uncontrolled improves a small country's
welfare if following liberalization it imports the good; but if it exports it, the negative
environmental effects are subtracted from the gains from trade, and the welfare effect is
ambiguous.  By importing the polluting good, a country lets some other country worry about its
polluting properties.  By exporting it, it continues to face the social cost of these externalities in
the home market.
Now suppose that instead of leaving erosion uncontrolled, the small country combined10
trade reform with an environmental policy intervention sufficient to internalize the externality. 
Such an intervention could take the form of a tax, charge, or equivalent regulation or change in
property rights.   Given such an environmental policy intervention, the gain from trade
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liberalization is qcf in Figure 1(a) and cij in Figure 1(b), depending on whether corn is imported
or exported.  In contrast to the situation in which no environmental intervention occurs, this is a
net gain in either the importing or exporting case.
It is important to note, however, that without environmental intervention, the benefits of
liberalization for the exporter would be even greater, by cde.  Hence, an incentive exists for net
exporters to forego environmental interventions because the benefits from trade are reduced
somewhat by the production declines resulting from such environmental policy interventions.  In
this restricted sense, it is accurate to say that environmental interventions reduce an exporting
nation's "competitiveness."  But the larger loss is in net welfare, in that without such
interventions, it is not clear that expanded exports will improve net welfare at all.  However,
whether a small country is an importer or an exporter, there is a welfare gain from trade
provided that a targeted (nearly optimal) environmental policy is introduced.
A third proposition concerns the relative efficacy of trade and environmental policy
instruments.  Suppose that instead of targeted environmental policy interventions aimed at
erosion control, it was proposed to use a trade instrument such as an export tax aimed at the
same target.  This is shown in Figure 1(b).  An export tax could be used equal to js to lower the
price producers receive from P  to P1, reducing production and lowering exports form C Q  to 11 xx
C1Q1.  This would lower the marginal cost of production to a level equivalent to an xx
environmental intervention, producing a welfare gain of shaded area jmk.  But the export tax11
causes consumers to pay P1P  below the opportunity cost of OP , leading to a deadweight 11 1
welfare loss due to excess domestic consumption C C1, equal to the shaded area iuv.  Hence, xx
using a trade policy instrument reduces environmental degradation as much as an environmental
tax set at the same rate, but at higher cost.  Trade instruments can thus be used to reduce
environmental degradation by a given amount, but they generally will improve welfare less than
a more direct intervention at the source of the environmental pollution, and may even worsen
welfare.
Moving from the small to the large country case, it is possible that the liberalization and/or
environmental policies undertaken will affect world prices, so that the price lines in Figures 1(a)
and 1(b) are no longer horizontal.  Moreover, the environmental policies and polluting activities
of large countries such as the United States or European Community will have global impacts,
spilling over and ultimately back into home markets and welfare.  Finally, policy changes in
large countries may have demonstration or leadership effects on other countries.
In summary, the welfare effects of liberalizing trade are ambiguous if environmental
externalities are left uncontrolled;  but if they are largely internalized by an appropriately
targeted environmental policy, the joint "liberalization effect" and "environmental effect" on
welfare is positive.  Simple welfare analysis thus offers a rudimentary analytical foundation for
issues in trade and the environment.  At an empirical level, however, there is still very little
understanding of the effects of trade liberalization on the environment, and how different
commodities and countries will be affected.  Trade liberalization is also unlikely to be total or all
inclusive, so that distortions and adverse environmental impacts will remain.  This analytical
exercise demonstrates an important overriding lesson:  environmental externalities influence the12
welfare outcomes of trade; and trade influences the way in which externalities are borne and
resolved.  This interdependence requires further analysis, not only at the level of theory, but in
terms of recent experience and empirical research.
The Environmental Impacts of Trade
The impacts of trade on environmental quality have been an important focus of opposition
to trade liberalization, especially in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
However, most claims about the negative environmental impacts of trade liberalization have
been based on limited evidence.  In fact, the impacts of trade on the environment vary greatly in
degree and by location.  In agriculture, for example, there is evidence that reducing subsidies
and trade distortions would often help to reduce environmental damages by lowering fertilizer
and pesticide use and increasing the efficiency with which soil and water resources are used
(Runge, 1990; Harold and Runge, 1993).
In the industrial border region of Mexico,  by contrast, limited investment in wastewater
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treatment and hazardous waste disposal has created serious environmental damages resulting
from foreign investments.  These damages reflect a failure to address the environmental
externalities of larger scale U.S./Mexico trade.  Yet the NAFTA process has also brought these
problems to wider attention, stimulating new environmental investments and the enforcement of
stricter standards that would be less likely under a situation of no trade.  These investments are
part of the trade impacts of NAFTA's environmental "side agreement;" stricter standards will be
overseen by the North American Commission on Environment (NACE), an institutional by-
product of trade liberalization.  As trade growth raises incomes, demands for a cleaner13
environment also tend to rise, and new regulatory constraints induce technological innovations
which are more environmentally benign (Runge, 1987; Grossman and Kreuger, 1991).
Five separate impacts of trade growth on the environment may be distinguished.  These
effects are (1) on allocative efficiency; (2) on scale; (3) on the composition of output; (4) on
technology; (5) on policy.  The overall effect of trade on the environment is the sum of these
separate impacts, which may be positive or negative, depending on the case examined.
Allocative Efficiency
Since Adam Smith (1776) first analyzed the impact of trade on production, it has been
observed that greater allocative efficiency results when countries specialize in producing those
things for which they have a natural advantage, and then trade with other nations for other
products, rather than attempting to produce all of the products in demand at home.  Formalized
as the theory of comparative advantage, it predicts that countries will utilize their natural and
human resources in such a way that abundant resources will be used more in the production of
goods and services than scarce resources, which will be conserved.  To the extent that these
"factor proportions" rule, trade will promote allocative efficiency by inducing patterns of
production which are less wasteful than if every country tried to produce a full range of goods
and services itself.
In this sense, more open trade leads to higher levels of economic satisfaction than inward-
looking policies closed to trade, and reduces waste of scarce resources.  This efficiency in
production and exchange means that, for a given endowment of resources, trade will be less
wasteful than autarchy, the absence of trade.  The best empirical evidence of the wastefulness14
arising from closed economies comes from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where
"self-sufficiency" often justified widespread environmental destruction (Boyd, 1993).  Less
dramatic, but substantial, environmental damage has resulted from the European Community's
drive for self-sufficiency in agriculture (Hartmann and Matthews, 1993).  However, the exercise
of comparative advantage and more open trade is itself not inconsistent with overexploitation of
globally scarce resources.  If country A is endowed with locally abundant resources S and trades
them to country B in return for locally abundant resources W, it may still be true that S or W,
while locally abundant, are globally scarce, and would be better conserved than traded.  The
former Soviet Union, to take a recent example, has offered opportunities to Western game
hunters to hunt a variety of globally endangered species, at prices driven low by foreign
currency scarcity and internal competition (Schapiro, 1993).  If these hunting opportunities are
traded because of their relative abundance in the Soviet Union, it does not diminish the fact that
they deplete globally scarce endangered species.   The relative efficiency of comparative
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advantage and trade is just that:  relative.
Scale
Granting the allocative efficiency of trade relative to no trade, there is still little question
that the scale of economic activity in a world with no trade would probably be much lower, and
in this limited sense would impose less wear and tear on the environment.  As a mental
experiment, such a world would somewhat resemble turning back the clock three or four
hundred years, eliminating rail and road transportation based on hydrocarbon fuels, international
air travel and transport, and returning largely to locally-based agricultural subsistence. 
Obviously, it is not possible to turn back the clock; and eliminating trade in the face of today's15
population levels would probably lead to a global economic and ecological catastrophe, as a
population many times that of three or four centuries ago attempted unsuccessfully to revert to
local subsistence.  The role of increased trade in supporting income growth per capita, and thus
supporting higher levels of employment for growing populations is clear.  In the U.S., for
example, it is estimated that without the growth in U.S. exports (which doubled between 1985
and 1992), the 1990-93 recession would have been twice as deep, with 100% higher levels of
unemployment than in fact occured.  Trade growth has been especially notable with developing
countries.  U.S. export sales to developing countries, according to the U.S. Department of
Commerce, rose to $167 billion in 1992, up 14 percent from 1991, largely 
offsetting weak demand from Japan and the European Community.  Exports to developing countries
increased in 1992 to 37 percent of total, up from 32 percent in 1990 (Greenhouse, 1993).
As this trade growth increases GDP per capita, does the scale of economic activity do
damage to the environment in the same or similar proportions?  The question of scale can be
thought of in the following sense:  as growth in GDP per capita occurs (due in part to trade),
does pollution increase at the same, decreasing, or an increasing rate, or does it actually
decrease?  Grossman and Kreuger (1991) report evidence that when a cross-section of countries
was studied over time, pollution measured by particulates and SO  increased at a decreasing rate 2
with GDP per capita up to a threshold of about $5,000 U.S. dollars a year, then decreased,
although the total began increasing again at higher income levels (Figure 2).  This nonlinear
relationship between the scale of economic activity and the level of pollution suggests that other
forces are at work, influencing how growth due in part to trade affects levels of environmental
quality.  These include the composition of output, technology, and policy decisions.16
Composition of Output
Environmental impacts of trade due to the composition of output can occur when increases
in GDP lead to reduced heavy manufactures with large levels of pollution and shifts to higher
levels of services with lower levels of pollution.  This change in the composition of output may
influence total pollution levels, offsetting some of the scale effects of economic growth through
trade.  The relative growth of the services versus the manufacturing sector in the higher income
nations, coupled with their decreasing per capita levels of certain pollutants, suggests that shifts
in the composition of output may play a role (see Dean, 1992).
Technology
A fourth way in which trade may affect the environment is through induced technological
innovations.  As increased value is given to environmental quality with increases in income,
markets for "green" technologies may develop and grow.  These environmental technologies
(such as wastewater treatment or materials recycling) may also be accompanied by changes in
traditional technologies (such as shifts toward more energy efficient and less polluting steel
production) which lower the overall level of residuals and hazards from manufacturing
processes.  Some companies have found that new waste reduction technologies are highly
profitable.  In 1986, for example, Dow Chemical launched its Waste Reduction Always Pays
(WRAP) program, credited with saving millions of dollars.  Similar efforts are underway at
other companies, including Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (3-M) and Shell Oil (Rice,
1993).  These experiences suggest that incentives for environmentally beneficial technological
innovation may be greater at larger, more integrated manufacturing firms.17
Policy
All of the environmental effects of trade discussed above, whether arising from allocative
efficiency, scale, composition of output, or technology, operate in the context of government
policies.  Indeed, there is reason to believe that without the increasing stringency of
environmental regulation, many of the incentives to alter the character and methods of
production so as to reduce waste and pollution would be far weaker.  While trade may encourage
greater allocative efficiency, the negative scale effects of economic growth on the environment
are only offset by composition and technology to a degree largely determined by the regulatory
framework.  It is the political will to impose such discipline on environmental externalities
which ensures that trade liberalization is ultimately welfare-enhancing.  In the U.S., for example,
since 1986 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has required a Toxic Release Inventory
(TRI), in which plants of 10,000 U.S. manufacturers report annual releases from their facilities
into the air, ground and water of some 317 toxic chemicals.  These include asbestos, freon, and
PCBs, as well as 20 toxic chemical categories such as lead compounds.  As this list continues to
grow, companies and the public have an increasing basis to "keep score," utilizing measures such
as TRI releases per dollar of sales.  Dow Chemical, for example, eliminated practices of
injecting hazardous wastes underground before the TRI began, reducing this ratio, while Du
Pont chemical failed to do so (Rice, 1993, p. 115).  On the one hand, this regulatory framework
creates a quantitative basis for reducing emissions.  On the other hand, it can create incentives to
move production to foreign plants where such oversight is less stringent.18
Total Effects
The sum of these effects of trade on the environment may be positive or negative,
depending on the industry or pollutant involved.  Schematically, we can think of trade as
inducing allocative efficiency, which in turn leads to economic growth and increased GDP per
capital, with attendant negative scale effects.  These scale effects may lead to increases in
demands for environment protection and policies to accomplish this protection, inducing
changing output composition and production technologies which in turn diminish negative
externalities (see Figure 3).  However, in many cases this chain of events is broken by failures to
develop and enforce regulations leading to the internalization of externalities.  Where demands
for environmental protection are not expressed or heard, as in many poor developing countries,
changes in policy leading to changes in composition and technology may not occur.
This was the situation until relatively recently in Mexico.  However, one of the most
interesting and potentially beneficial consequences of the NAFTA has been to help induce
institutional changes both in Mexico and under the trilateral "side-agreement" to NAFTA.  These
changes will help to develop more stringent levels of environmental protection and enforcement
in Mexico as well as in the U.S. and Canada.  This "environmental conditionality" represents an
important new chapter in the evolution of institutional responses to the interaction of trade and
environment (see Runge, 1994).  We turn now to the opposite side of the trade/environment
nexus, the impact of domestic environmental regulations on trade, and their role as disguised
forms of trade protection.19
Environmental Measures and Trade Burdens
When domestic environmental measures lead to claims of trade harm, it is generally
because a burden has been imposed on individuals or firms seeking to export or import goods or
services in the name of domestic (and sometimes global) environmental protection.  The
question is whether the environmental measure is justified primarily as a form of necessary
environmental protection, or is a disguised restriction to trade, in which harmful trade effects
loom proportionately larger than beneficial environmental effects.
The issue of whether a government environmental regulation is a nontariff trade barrier is
a question faced domestically in the U.S. by the states under the commerce clause of the U.S.
Constitution, and by the 12 member states in the European Community under the Treaty of
Rome.  Such questions typically break down into two parts:  (1) does the measure create a
burden on trade?  (2) is the burden justified by the environmental benefits of the regulation? 
From a legal perspective the apparent burden imposed on trade is a "gateway concept."  If a
burden appears to be present, it opens the way to further inquiry as to its justification, in which
its benefits for the environment are weighed against its harm to trade (Hudec and Farber, 1992). 
If "no burden" is found, then the trade effects of the regulation are not at issue (see Figure 4).
While nearly all environmental regulations impose some differential burdens on
commercial transactions, to be trade-related this differential must exist between some foreign
producers and their domestic competition.  This differential may be relatively easy to see, as
when foreign products are subjected to obviously different standards compared with domestic
products.  Under Section 337 of the 1930 Trade Act, for example, certain trade cases for foreign
violators are heard before the International Trade Commission (ITC), while cases against U.S.20
firms charged with similar violations are sent to U.S. courts.  In general, going before the ITC is
regarded as more burdensome to the defendant.  Not every differential rule clearly constitutes a
burden, however, even though domestic and foreign products are treated differently.  Auto safety
glass inspected at U.S. auto manufacturers' factories is different from inspections of foreign
vehicles' windshields at the border, but the border inspections do not appear to create a
differential burden.
Less obvious are standards which appear neutral on their face, but have a differential
impact on foreign and domestic products.  Provisions of the 1985 Farm Bill sought to apply
sanitary processing and inspection standards to chicken from outside the U.S. that were "the
same" as those standards used domestically ("the same" standards were substituted for previous
language by members of Congress from Arkansas).  The previous language had called for
foreign standards "at least equal to" those used domestically.  In a case brought before the
federal court for the Southern District of Mississippi, the language calling for "the same"
standard was upheld, despite warnings from the Department of Agriculture that "such a
definitional finding would augur dire foreign trade implications...".
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Overall, balancing legal and economic judgements must be made in order to extend the
regulation of environmental risk into the international arena.  Where trade measures lead to
environmental risks, these risks can be remedied through regulations.  However many such risks
are not subject to regulations in the home market, and may require negotiations with other
countries, whether bilaterally or trilaterally as in NAFTA, or multilaterally, through international
agreements.  Where environmental actions lead to trade distortion, then the burden on trade must
be assessed in relation to the environmental benefits, to determine if the trade burden is justified. 21
Again, the decision that a trade-distorting environmental regulation is justified cannot be wholly
unilateral.  Consultation and agreement with other countries is likely to be necessary.
Environment-Trade Interactions:  The Montreal Protocol
As the number of international environmental agreements (IEAs) has grown in recent
years, new questions have arisen concerning the relationship between these agreements and
existing or future trade obligations in GATT (see Wirth, 1992).  First, there is the question of
whether countries are parties or non-parties to the treaties, such as the Montreal Protocol
affecting chlorofluorocarbon and halon emissions damaging to atmospheric ozone.  The
Montreal Protocol, signed in 1987 and amended by the London Amendments in 1990, commits
the signatory parties to study the feasibility of a ban applied to nonmember countries against
imports of products made with a process that uses the ozone-depleting chemicals, as well as
various other actions affecting trade in these products.  In January, 1993, for example,
signatories were scheduled to ban the export of these substances to non-parties.   However,
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fewer than 20 countries were signatories by 1992, whereas over 100 countries are signatories to
the GATT Articles.  If countries are parties to GATT, with all of the trade obligations that this
implies; and are also parties to the Montreal Protocol, with all of the environmental obligations
this implies, then what if these obligations conflict?  Alternatively, what if countries who have
signed the Montreal Protocol take trade actions to ban imports from countries who have not
signed the Protocol?  Clearly, principles must be established to determine matters of priority and
consistency.
In addition to the question of obligations under various treaties to which countries are
pledged, there is the question of "extrajurisdictionality", or whether countries have rights to22
impose trade measures in response to the environmental policies of other countries.  This issue
has come to the forefront with the U.S./Mexico dispute over whether the U.S. can, under GATT,
ban imports of tuna caught with fishing methods which kill dolphins in the process, even if these
actions are taken outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
A third question, related to the first two, is the legal standing of IEAs versus GATT
obligations.  While the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides general rules on the
relationship of successive treaties, notably that the treaty "later in time" prevails,  the rule
10
applies only where the two treaties address the same subject matter.  In the case of a party to
both the Montreal Protocol and GATT, for example, the section of the Protocol banning imports
of substances produced with ozone depleting chemicals would prevail over any inconsistent
provisions of GATT (assuming the GATT Articles are considered a treaty).  While the "later in
time" rule of the Vienna Convention allows subsequent environmental agreements to "trump"
trade obligations, some feel it may make it too easy to override trade rules in the name of these
objectives (Housman, 1992, p. 3).  In cases in which a country is not a party to the IEA, the
Vienna Convention (Article 34) states that an IEA that is later in time cannot bind non-party
states without their consent, unless the treaty rules becomes customary international law (see
Jackson, 1992).
In response to this lack of definition and clarity, some leading authorities have proposed a
"waiver" for IEAs, at least temporarily, until better definitions and understanding can be worked
out.  A waiver limited to say, five years, could include specific current IEAs and provide for
future ones as well.  In addition to the Montreal Protocol, such a waiver might initially include
two other major environmental agreements, the Convention on International Trade in23
Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna,  and the Basel Convention on the Control of
11
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal.
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In summary, there is currently no consensus on the complicated intermeshing of trade
obligations and IEAs.  The critical questions include treatment of parties and non-parties, the
reach of extraterritorial actions to protect the environment, the standing of IEAs versus GATT
obligations, and the issue of a waiver for IEAs until some of these questions can be answered
more clearly and definitively.
Institutional Issues
As the 20th Century draws to a close, two global trends are converging.  The first, and
most powerful, is the increasing integration of the world economy, and the resulting
interdependence of domestic and international policies affecting trade in goods and services. 
This trend creates both greater trade frictions, and greater opportunities to develop mutually
beneficial trading relationships.  It also tests the rules of trade developed under the auspices of
the GATT and regional trading arrangements such as the EC and the NAFTA.
The second global trend is the increasing value placed on protection of the environment,
and the need for national and international policies of environmental preservation to minimize
the bads and disservices that trade can bring.  Despite differences in the emphasis given to
environment in the North versus the South, there is little doubt that environmental issues will
continue to dominate international discussion, including North-South dialogues, in the year
ahead, especially given the transformation and diminished security threats posed by East-West
relations.24
These two global trends are now intertwining in complex ways.  These complexities have
been the subject of this paper.  Yet despite the many technical issues involved, an important and
simple complementarity also exists (Repetto, 1993).  In much the same way that international
trade rules have evolved in and outside of GATT in response to global economic
interdependence, so new international environmental rules are now evolving in response to
global environmental interdependence.  Out of this mutual evolution an opportunity arises to
link the objectives of market integration with environmental protection.  Curiously, because the
gap between environmental standards in the North and South is so great, it is precisely along the
North/South axis that the opportunity for such linkage is also greatest.
In the same way that differences in resource endowments create gains from trade between
dissimilar nations, so differences in levels of development and environmental protection can
create complementaries built on incentives to exchange market access to the North in return for
commitments to raise environmental standards in the South.  The essential bargain in the making
is to link one of the primary objectives of the Uruguay Round of GATT (more open market
access) with the objective of raised levels of environmental protection.  This is precisely what
the negotiations over an environmental side-agreement to NAFTA have reflected:  a promise of
access to the markets of North America in return for a commitment to environmental
improvements and enforcement.  What the NAFTA experience suggests most clearly, however,
is that trade rules alone are inadequate to the task:  environmental rules are also required.  And
where such rules are developed, new institutions will be required to monitor and enforce them.
For more than a decade, the U.S. relinquished its role as a leader in international
environmental affairs, while continuing aggressively to pursue both regional and multilateral25
trade agreements.  The consequence was to open it to criticism that freer trade was being
pursued without regard to its environmental consequences.  Restoring balance in the relationship
between free trade and a protected environment now requires that the U.S. undertake comparable
efforts to create new rules for international environmental policy.  In many respects, the
opportunity to take the lead in this arena fits naturally with the redefinition of international
security resulting from the end of the Cold War.
Both trade and the environment have emerged in the Post Cold War era as issues of
primary importance, leading to a new sense of international security, defined in economic and
ecological terms (Mathews, 1989).  Yet until recently ecological security has often been
regarded as competitive with economic prosperity, creating an either/or proposition for
policymakers.  While trade-offs will often be necessary between environmental quality and
unrestrained trade, it is increasingly clear that many areas of complementarity exist as well (see
Freeman, 1992).  In order to exploit this complementarity, it will be necessary to develop rules
and incentives for environmental protection at both national and international levels which
accomplish their objectives with as few burdens for market forces as is feasible; conversely,
market expansion must proceed within constraints which protect nations from the negative
externalities of economic activity.
In this process, the U.S. will need to take the lead, as reflected in negotiations over an
environmental side-agreement to NAFTA.  Despite progress in the European Community on
both economic and environmental grounds, the unified Europe and new European leadership
promoted early in the decade has not emerged (see Krause, 1991).  Japan, clearly a powerful
force in trade, and a leader in some areas of environmental control technologies, has not yet fully26
embraced the Uruguay Round goals of market access and the Rio Conference objective of global
environmental improvement.  By contrast, the North American Free Trade Agreement and its
side-agreements, if successful, offer in microcosm precisely the sort of complementarity between
trade liberalization and environmental protection possible on a global scale.
There is unlikely to be so lasting a set of institutional issues and challenges for this and
future governments than to achieve a new balance between trade and environmental interests,
both North and South.  In contrast to the balance of destructive forces which has dominated
negotiations between nations in the post-war era, this new balance is one of welfare
improvements from both economic and environmental sources.  To achieve such an equilibrium
would reward the welfare of this generation, and generations to come, with continued prosperity
and improved environmental quality.27
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Figure 3
Trade Impacts on the Environment
Trade  ￿ ￿  Allocative Efficiency (+)  ￿ ￿  Growth in GDP/capita
￿ ￿  Scale effects (–)  ￿ ￿  Demand for Environmental Protection  ￿ ￿ 
Change in Policy  ￿ ￿  Change in Composition (+)  ￿ ￿  Change in Technology (+).
(+ denotes positive and – negative environmental impacts)